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Abstract. In this paper we argue that recent developments in peer-to-peer plat-
forms, including those underpinned by distributed-ledger technology (or block-
chains), represent a new model for organizing collective action, which we term 
the “marketized-commons” model. Drawing on social psychological and eco-
nomic theory, we compare this concept to established modes of organizing col-
lective action. We also consider the marketized-commons model in relation to 
other peer-to-peer economies. We consider why individuals might be motivated 
to create and use platforms underpinned by the marketized-commons model, as 
well as how it might be counterproductive for cooperation, collaboration, partic-
ipation and social goals. Finally, we recommend implications for those interested 
in designing peer-to-peer platforms to support collective action. Ultimately, we 
argue that to develop effective platforms in this context designers need to look 
beyond the financial considerations of individual platform users. Rather, they 
also need a concern for social psychological principles and processes, specifically 
how groups work and operate in these settings. 
Keywords: Collective action · Peer-to-peer · Social identity approach. 
1 Introduction 
Digital technology has enabled greater connections between individuals. The Internet 
allows individuals to connect to, and cooperate with, known and unknown others. In 
particular, recent years have seen the rise of peer-to-peer (P2P) platforms, which enable 
users to interact with one another directly for the production and exchange of goods. 
For example, ‘peer-to-peer markets’, such as eBay and Airbnb, enable individuals and 
small organizations to connect with unknown others to exchange goods and services 
for money [1]. These platforms empower individuals against established structures, 
which is often referred to as the disruptive potential of connecting individuals. In con-
trast ‘commons-based peer production’ platforms enable volunteers to come together 
for collective enterprise. Platforms like Wikipedia, Pirate Bay and NASA’s ClickWork-
ers allow users to cooperate to produce knowledge or goods for others without the need 
for market pricing to structure their efforts [2].  
Here, we are interested in a third variant of P2P platform, which we term ‘market-
ized-commons’ platforms. Marketized-commons platforms attempt to incentivize col-
laborative efforts through market principles. In order to advance ideals that are per-
ceived to be beneficial for society (‘the common good’), developers are creating P2P 
platforms that enable collective action participation to bought and sold between plat-
form users. Here, we define collective action as: “action taken by a group (either di-
rectly or on its behalf through an organization) in pursuit of members’ perceived shared 
interests” [3]. So, by collective action participation we mean activities like the produc-
tion of renewable electricity by those who wish to avert catastrophic climate change. 
Accordingly, there are P2P platforms that enable users to produce and trade renewable 
electricity with others [4]. Similarly, Slock.it’s hypothetical SweepTheStreets platform 
enables a group of neighborhood residents who want their streets cleaned to hire other 
residents from the same neighborhood to clean the streets [5].  
We argue that this third type of P2P platform represents a new model for organizing 
collective action, we call this model the marketized-commons model. What is novel 
about these platforms is that they involve turning collective action participation into a 
commodity. Households have traditionally produced renewable electricity as a means 
of reducing CO2 to fight against climate change [6–8]. Similarly, communities have 
traditionally achieved the clean street outcome of SweepTheStreets through voluntary 
work (e.g., seattlecleanstreet.org). Thus, these new platforms ‘marketize’ collective ac-
tion participation; they transform it to a market-based economy. In this way, market-
ized-commons platforms are enabling individuals to come together to create a market 
where there previously was none. Consequently, they transform the very notion of col-
lective action by allowing market forces to become a basis for its organization [9]. 
However, how can we ensure that marketized-commons platforms support collabora-
tion, cooperation and user aims to advance the common good? 
In the present paper, our objective is twofold: First we will introduce the marketized-
commons model that underpins these platforms, outlining its importance for the human-
computer interaction (HCI) community; and second we will describe how social sci-
ence can help designers create marketized-commons platforms that support users’ 
goals. Beyond technical infrastructure, there may be skepticism about what is new, dif-
ferent or interesting about different types of P2P platform. Rather than simply a novel 
technical artifact, we argue that marketized-commons platforms are interesting because 
they create new opportunities for different types of social relations, and enable new 
motivations for contributing to the common good. In particular, they create a market-
based structure for motivating, organizing and enacting collective action participation. 
We are interested in understanding how these market-based platforms work: how they 
enable collaboration, coordinate effort, and advance users’ goals. We suggest that in 
order to address these questions we first need to recognize the model of organization 
that underpins these platforms; we outline this model and use it as a basis to engage 
with further questions about marketized-commons platforms.  
We propose that to fully understand how these platforms work, we need to consider 
the relationship between the collective and the self, and how design choices affect this 
relationship. We suggest that the social identity approach is a fruitful framework for 
this aim. The social identity approach is a social psychological framework grounded in 
the principle that in certain contexts an individual’s subjective sense of self is defined 
and experienced as something that is ‘collective’ and identical to a group of other peo-
ple [10]. This premise stands in contrast to popular conceptions of the self as something 
that is innately individual and personal. Likewise, it goes further than conventional un-
derstandings of a social self that might be public and perceived by others, or have social 
elements that have been adopted from social groups [10]. Given HCI’s focus on the 
interface between humans and computers, and the increasing attention in HCI on P2P 
platforms, the marketized-commons model brings together HCI’s core interests with a 
number of social psychological and social structural concerns. In particular, it leads us 
to reflect on how the HCI community might benefit by a closer consideration of the 
relationship between the collective and the self.  
We begin in Section 2 by reviewing existing research that examines collective action 
and the potential role of technology in supporting participation. In section 3 we move 
on to explore ‘P2P’ as a concept, and detail different types of P2P platforms that are 
already recognized in existing research. In section 4 we identify and introduce a novel 
concept, which is the ‘marketized-commons’ model and outline its distinguishing fea-
tures. We then move on to explore the social psychological and social structural as-
sumptions underlying the marketized-commons model and consider how these present 
a challenge to platform designers. In section 5 we introduce the social identity ap-
proach. Finally, in section 6 we consider implications for designers and make design 
recommendations for marketized-commons platforms. 
2 Why Collective Action? 
How can we encourage individuals to take action to uphold the common good? Social 
scientists have frequently grappled with the problem of cooperation. Evidence suggests 
that it is difficult to get individuals to pursue collective – rather than individual – goals 
when self-interest and joint-interest do not align [11–13]. Although there are different 
types of cooperation, here we are particularly concerned with collective action. Given 
that the benefits obtained by collective action are equally available to all regardless of 
an individual’s contribution (i.e. a public good; such as clean air, women’s rights, Na-
tional Health Service), and that participation in collective action is costly (e.g., time, 
associated financial costs), individuals can personally benefit by not participating in 
collective action and instead relying on the contribution of others [14, 15]. Unsurpris-
ingly, a classic question in social science is what makes collective action possible [15–
18]. 
Traditional solutions to the problem of cooperation in collective action include pri-
vate ownership of the commons resource, community mobilization, and institutions for 
collective action [17, 18]. However, these solutions are not without fault. For example, 
private owners can restrict access to a resource and thereby prevent it from collapsing, 
but private ownership isn’t applicable to moveable resources (e.g., fish, water, clear air; 
[18]). Similarly, Community mobilization relies on groups to work together to foster 
cooperation, but the organization of groups can be time consuming and expensive [16]. 
While institutions for collective action encourage participation by providing sanctions 
for unwanted behavior and/or selective incentives for desired actions, but incentive pro-
vision is expensive to implement, and unreliable incentive provision encourages free-
riding [18]. Accordingly, there has been great interest in creating alternative mecha-
nisms to facilitate collective action participation; ICTs represent an alternative set of 
tools. 
Although facilitating collective action is clearly a socially-relevant topic, and a num-
ber of papers examine the intersection of collective action and ICTs, it may not be ap-
parent why HCI researchers should be concerned with designing to support collective 
action participation. Societies have invariably relied on tools to support participation in 
collective action. Traditional devices, such as institutions for collective action and pri-
vate ownership, have historically been used for organizing, motivating and coordinat-
ing collective action to achieve a shared goal [7]. Thus, collective action participation 
encompasses challenges that are central to HCI, like facilitating collaboration and co-
ordinating action. Moreover, when tools for supporting collective action participation 
are embodied in technology, the design of this technology is fundamental for its effi-
cacy [19].  
Accordingly, research in HCI and CSCW has considered how digital technology can 
support collective action. Existing work has examined the role of technology in facili-
tating collective action, as well as implications for technology design [20–24]. Scholars 
have typically been concerned with the ways that technology can reduce the costs as-
sociated with organizing and participating in collective action. For example, many so-
cial media platforms enable users to share photos about key issues and events, which 
can enforce transparency and thereby establish the legitimacy of involved actors and 
organizations [25]. Similarly, the increased availability of one-to-many communication 
afforded by email, SMS and social media can lower the costs of organizing action as it 
can freely promote campaigns to global audiences and be utilized to create bottom-up 
definitions of movement issues [24, 26, 27].  
In addition to examining existing platforms, developers have created new systems 
to support collective action. Dynamo was created to help crowd workers pitch ideas for 
action, which are voted on by others, with action taken upon winning ideas [22]. WeDo 
was designed to support end-to-end collective action by enabling the creation of high-
level missions, it allows users to create ideas for missions and vote on how to achieve 
them [28]. Similarly, Catalyst utilizes activation thresholds to coordinate collective ac-
tion events [29]. Taken together, this research indicates that digital technology can cre-
ate new opportunities for communication and action that can be employed to facilitate 
collective action participation. It also emphasizes the role of the HCI community in 
designing and critically evaluating platforms for collective action. 
Nevertheless, although a large body of research examines computer-supported col-
lective action, and many different tools are designed to facilitate cooperation, less HCI 
research has critically examined or made explicit the models of organization that un-
derpin such platforms. In particular, research is yet to consider how different models of 
organizing collective action – when instantiated in technology – can shape users’ mo-
tives for participating in collective action and thereby influence key processes; such as 
coordinating effort, enabling collaboration, shared sense-making and participation, as 
well as the actualization of users’ aims to advance the common good. Here we define 
and examine a new model for organizing collective action that is emerging in technol-
ogy development: the marketized-commons model. This model suggests that by treat-
ing collective action participation as a commodity, and trading it through P2P plat-
forms, we can create better motivation for participating in collective action. This model 
represents a marked distinction from those underpinning the types of collective action 
technologies previously examined in HCI. However, while these platforms present 
many new and exciting opportunities, they also introduce novel challenges that we will 
proceed to outline. This creates an opportunity for the HCI community take an engaged 
role in shaping the success of marketized-commons platforms, we describe how attend-
ing to users’ collective and group-level motivations can provide direction for such en-
deavors.  
An examination of marketized-commons platforms – and the organizing model that 
forms a basis for participation in these platforms – could also shed light on central con-
cerns in HCI and CSCW such as awareness, cooperative sense-making, coordination 
and motivation. Although HCI has a longstanding record of engaging with psychology, 
less work has built upon social psychological research that examines group processes 
and the relationship between the collective and the self. Here we draw on the social 
identity approach, a social psychological framework that seeks to explain how group 
memberships shape cognitions and behavior. Before providing a more detailed outline 
of the social identity approach, we introduce the marketized-commons model and ex-
isting research that examines P2P platforms for collaboration and exchange.  
3 Crowdsourcing and Peer-to-Peer Platforms 
Societal shifts and advances in digital technology have seen the rise of crowdsourcing 
and P2P platforms. Enabled by digital technology, these ways of interacting are con-
cerned with facilitating cooperation among individuals and groups. ‘P2P’ does not refer 
to a specific technology nor initiative, and there is debate around its precise definition. 
However, it typically describes a series of ideas and tools that allow decentralized dis-
tributed computing and direct transfer of data between individuals, without a central-
ized infrastructure [30, 31]. Likewise, rather than a specific set of technologies, 
crowdsourcing describes a paradigm that outsources jobs, which are normally per-
formed by individuals, to an unspecific group of others [32, 33]. Researchers working 
in HCI and CSCW have examined crowdsourcing and P2P platforms in a number of 
distinct settings and have typically asked how design can motivate and sustain partici-
pation and collaboration [19, 33, 34]. 
Although a variety of different P2P and crowdsourcing platforms have been de-
signed, one way to explore the similarities and differences in these platforms is by con-
sidering their social aims and outcomes. In particular, researchers examining the inter-
section of ICTs and society have identified P2P markets and commons-based peer pro-
duction as two distinct types of P2P platform that are concerned with actualizing dif-
ferent types of good. P2P markets enable individuals to exchange goods and services 
for money. Exemplified by platforms such as eBay, Uber and Airbnb, they help buyers 
and sellers find each other and engage in trustworthy transactions [1]. Thus, P2P mar-
kets are primarily concerned with ‘private goods’, which are benefits that can be with-
held from an individual, and use of the goods prevents its use by others (e.g., food, 
clothing, most purchasable goods; [3]). In contrast, commons-based peer production 
aims to facilitate the production of public goods. As a specific instance of crowdsourc-
ing, commons-based peer production allows individuals to collaborate through collec-
tive action to produce a public good without the need for market pricing or managing 
hierarchy to coordinate individuals’ efforts; examples of platforms include Wikipedia, 
Pirate Bay and ClickWorkers [2]. In sum, whereas P2P markets exist to facilitate coop-
eration in financial transactions and market exchange, commons-based peer production 
is intended to organise collaboration among volunteers for the production of freely 
available goods [1, 2].  
Nevertheless, while P2P markets and commons-based peer production exist as dis-
tinct modes for facilitating cooperation, we suggest that there is a new and emerging 
trend for hybrid marketized-commons platforms. These are decentralized networks, 
which operate on a P2P basis, for the production and trade of collective action partici-
pation. Marketized-commons platforms represent a new way to support cooperation in 
collective action. Specifically, subject to the laws of supply and demand, individuals 
operating within a decentralized network can buy and sell collective action participa-
tion. Thus, the marketized-commons model suggests that by marketizing collective ac-
tion participation we can better motivate individuals to participate in collective action. 
It implies that financial incentives, paid by users, can facilitate collaboration and en-
courage others to contribute to the common good. In the following section we outline 
the marketized-commons model describing both social and technical factors, we give 
examples of real-world and hypothetical platforms, and discuss the opportunities and 
challenges associated with this model.  
4 The Marketized-Commons Model 
Marketized-commons platforms enable groups of individuals to collaborate to produce 
a good, and other users to pay for these collaboration efforts. However, what is inter-
esting about these platforms is that rather than producing and trading goods that society 
has traditionally recognized as commodities, they are concerned with the production of 
public goods. Moreover, in contrast to commons-based peer production, which relies 
on volunteers, marketized-commons platforms involve turning collective action partic-
ipation into a commodity. Specifically, they are underpinned by an implicit model that 
assumes: (1) individuals are able to incentivize others financially to engage in collective 
action; and (2) by treating collective action participation as a commodity it is possible 
to advance the production of public goods. Thus, they are an attempt to marketize col-
lective action participation as a way to motivate users to engage in collective action and 
thereby produce public goods.  
Several real and hypothetical examples of marketized-commons platforms exist. P2P 
energy trading projects are some of the most frequent real-world instances [35–37]. As 
already outlined, within P2P energy platforms users are involved as both produc-
ers/sellers of renewable electricity (e.g., through solar panels installed on their houses) 
and as buyers through purchasing renewable electricity credits from other users [38]. 
SweepTheStreets is a further example, and one that we have already mentioned. It is a 
hypothetical network of neighborhood residents who want their streets cleaned and can 
hire other residents of the neighborhood to clean the streets [5]. Within an activism 
context, Demoscoin and ACT are under development [39, 40]. Demoscoin is designed 
to be paid to the early participants of social movements, funded by those who are sym-
pathetic to the cause. Similarly, the ACT platform enables activists to submit funding 
proposals that aim to advance the common good, in turn other users are able to buy 
ACT tokens and vote to decide which proposals receive funding. Although these plat-
forms have different aims and exist in different contexts, each involves a transformation 
of the very notion of collective action as platform developers expect users to incentivize 
the participation of others financially. Moreover, blockchain technology underpins each 
platform.  
Blockchains are an emerging technology that platform developers have recently ap-
plied to a collective action context. Publicized as a technology that has the potential to 
change the way that businesses are conducted and regulated, a blockchain is a distrib-
uted database that collects transaction records into groups (blocks) and stores them with 
reference to the previous block [38]. There are certain characteristics of blockchains 
that enable new opportunities for collective action in particular. For example, a ‘smart 
contract’ is: “a piece of code (running inside a blockchain platform) that represents and 
enforces the protocol and any terms of a contract agreed upon by the contractual par-
ties” [38]. They enable low-level housekeeping tasks (e.g., keeping records, providing 
information, contacting members, allocating resources) and governance rules (e.g., who 
should receive rewards and when) to be formalized, automated and enforced through 
software [41], which reduces the resources needed to for organizing collective action 
[9]. Nevertheless, marketized-commons platforms also present new challenges. In the 
following subsection, we begin by considering why developers may be interested in the 
marketized-commons as a model for organizing collective action. We then move on to 
consider specific challenges that the model presents to a collective action context with 
a particular focus on questioning the social psychological and structural assumptions 
that underpin the model. 
4.1 Challenges 
There may be several reasons why platform developers, policy makers and industry 
perceive marketized-commons platforms to be beneficial. Particularly because they 
provide new economic and business models. Global recession and increased economic 
austerity in the United States and Europe means that many governments have less 
money for public spending [42]. This means that there are limited subsidies to offset 
the financial costs of the production of public goods [43–45]. There is also an associated 
upsurge of neoliberal ideation, including privatization and increased individual respon-
sibility for welfare, which calls for reduced state intervention in social and economic 
affairs [46–48]. Thus, the desire for a marketized-commons structure may represent a 
changing social norm; specifically, society expects individuals to take responsibility for 
their own individual welfare, rather than relying on governments and taxpayer-funded 
schemes for producing public goods. Nevertheless, although marketized-commons 
platforms have the potential to be beneficial on a number of levels, existing literature 
indicates that the model that underpins these platforms may suboptimal in the long-
term. In particular, social psychological and structural conditions may create an envi-
ronment that constrains cooperation and equality goals.  
Motivation. There are a number of psychological assumptions implicit within the 
marketized-commons model. Firstly, it implies that cost-benefit calculations are the 
primary consideration in collective action decisions – that individuals are intuitive 
economists and will only participate in collective action when participation provides 
distinct and tangible benefits for the self. Although this assumption is consistent with 
early economic models of collective action [15], recent social psychological literature 
indicates that the proposed prominence of cost-benefit calculations in an oversimplifi-
cation. Importantly, it suggests that other motives, which are independent to economic 
considerations, are at least equally involved in the mobilization process [49]. Research 
indicates that there are a variety of intrinsic psychological motivations that can stimu-
late contribution to the common good. For example, feelings of injustice, identification 
with the group and the belief that one’s efforts can make a difference are fundamental 
motivators of collective action participation [50]. However, the marketized-commons 
model deemphasizes these intrinsic pathways. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest 
that compared to other motives financial incentives are generally poor drivers of col-
lective action participation [51]. Thus, a focus on financial incentives at the expense of 
intrinsic drivers of participation could make marketized-commons platforms subopti-
mal for stimulating participation.  
Sustaining participation. However, going further than this, there is also evidence 
to indicate that the use of financial incentives to facilitate collective action can be coun-
terproductive to user aims in the long-term. First of all, financial incentives for collec-
tive action participation can change how individuals perceive collective action and 
erode other motives for participation, which can have unintended effects on collective 
action [52–57]. For example, a focus on financial incentives can attract participants 
who don’t feel committed to the cause, have reduced willingness to give their time and 
are less inclined to engage in activities organized by the group [51]. Similarly, if the 
incentive is reduced or removed it can be difficult to sustain behavior [58]. Not only 
this, but there is evidence to demonstrate the negative effects of financial incentives on 
collective action can spill-over to other domains and undermine engagement in other 
prosocial actions that are not financially attractive [58]. Consequently, a marketized-
commons platform that relies on financial incentives may be detrimental for sustained 
participation by eroding intrinsic psychological motivations for engagement. 
Collaboration. Moving on from the question of whether financial incentives – in 
and of themselves – can adequately motivate participation, the P2P incentive model 
also provides its own unique challenges. Given that the marketized-commons model 
expects users to incentivize the participation of others, there may be a tension between 
self-interest and acting in the benefit of the group, which may be detrimental for coop-
eration and collaboration [18]. Specifically, buyers who use the platform may be pri-
marily motivated to pay the lowest price, while sellers want to achieve the highest price. 
Thus, it may become difficult to achieve a satisfactory financial arrangement for both 
parties and the financial incentive for collaboration may be weak. Although this issue 
is not unique to a marketized-commons and could happen in any market, within a public 
goods context it could present novel consequences in that individuals are not suffi-
ciently motivated to contribute to a public good and the good is not created.  
Moreover, when considering the broader concept of the common good, there may 
be circumstances where a component of the common good involves wide-ranging sup-
port, in other words cooperation with those who are not users of the platform. As in the 
case of P2P renewable electricity networks, where the price paid for electricity not only 
needs to incentivize individuals to produce renewable electricity, but it also needs to 
encompass national public goods, such as maintenance of the national electric grid, 
social obligations to those who are in fuel poverty, and future renewable electricity 
production [59]. If users are primarily looking to trade collective action participation at 
a price that benefits themselves these public goods could be eroded, as fewer resources 
are available for their production [60]. In sum, the tension between individual welfare 
and collective welfare may come to the forefront in a platform that relies on market 
pricing to create the conditions necessary for users to incentivize others to collaborate.  
Justice. Although we outlined several psychological assumptions implicit within the 
marketized-commons model, we also need to consider structural and societal-level con-
ditions. Specifically, the way that design choices might influence for poverty, access 
and social exclusion. To begin with, it is relevant to consider how power inequalities 
operate in these markets and how a marketized-commons model can contribute to the 
meaningful distribution of important goods [61]. Take for example the production of 
renewable electricity, there are a number of structural barriers to renewable energy pro-
duction. Buying renewable generation equipment involves substantial financial costs. 
Moreover, due to housing restrictions, it is unlikely that property owners will permit 
individuals in private rented, social housing or temporary accommodation to install – 
and/or receive the benefits of – renewable generation equipment. On the other side of 
the coin, in Slock.it’s description of SweepTheStreets, finically advantaged users might 
opt to ‘buy out’ of community responsibilities. Specifically, they might choose to pay 
others so that they do not have to do the work that the community needs to produce the 
public good. Thus, marketized-commons platforms have the potential to reproduce ex-
isting inequalities in power, tangible resources and status. 
The second consideration is whether participation and decision making in a block-
chain-enabled marketized-commons can ever be truly inclusive. A large body of liter-
ature has documented and examined a digital divide across a variety of contexts, which 
is social and economic inequality in the access, use and impact of digital technology 
[62]. Although research is yet to examine whether a digital divide exists in regards to 
blockchain technology, existing literature provides evidence for disparities based on 
age, income, education, and geographic location for various other technologies [63–
65]. A blockchain-enabled platform might exclude older people, people on low incomes 
or people with fewer years of formal education if platform developers to not design 
communications, training and the platforms themselves to be inclusive across demo-
graphic categories. Moreover, the algorithm mechanism that enables distributed con-
sensus presents novel challenges for inclusion. Specifically, because consensus in 
blockchains rely on the use of full nodes [66]. As there is substantial financial cost and 
technological expertise required to become a node there are likely to be systematic dis-
parities in decision-making power. Only certain types of people will be able to afford – 
and understand how – to become a node. Thus, there is a risk that marketized-commons 
platforms reproduce structural inequalities in decision-making power.  
In sum, in addition to the psychological assumptions underpinning a marketized-
commons model, there are a number of assumptions about who can access technology 
and attention, which platform developers need to consider. This is important because 
of the public goods context in general, but also because of the specific social issues 
contexts (e.g., climate change, activism) where platform developers are applying the 
marketized-commons model. Although these present key challenges to developers of 
marketized-commons platforms, we argue that designers can build better platforms by 
attending to the social psychological concerns of platforms users; in particular the rela-
tionship between the self and the collective. Social psychological research has long 
recognized the importance of intrinsic motives and subjective appraisals in motivating 
collective action participation. In particular, research within the social identity approach 
has found that group identities and group processes are integral to cooperation, collab-
oration, and participation, and that groups can be harnessed as a resource to motivate 
collective contribution to the common good [67, 68]. Thus, knowing why groups are 
important and how they operate, as well as understanding the contexts in which indi-
viduals experience a sense of collective self, can help developers design platforms that 
are more effective for advancing HCI and CSCW’s core concerns, as well as addressing 
key social issues. In the follow sections we outline how the social identity approach can 
provide an effective framework for these aims.  
5 The Social Identity Approach 
The social identity approach is a social psychological framework that incorporates so-
cial identity theory [69, 70] and self-categorization theory [71]. It suggests that people’s 
motivations, cognitions and behavior can be understood by examining group member-
ships and recognizing the existence of a collective self. The framework understands the 
self as existing on a continuum from personal (I) to social (we). It suggests that in ad-
dition to personal identity, individuals also have a range of social identities available to 
them that are collective in nature and drawn from their membership of social and psy-
chological groups [72, 73]. These different levels of the self are functionally antagonis-
tic, so as social identity becomes more salient personal identity decreases in salience 
[74]. 
The social identity approach argues that the content of social identities – their norms 
and values – will direct behavior [75, 76]. So, when a social identity is salient an indi-
vidual will act in accordance with its content. Importantly, the social context is said to 
play a fundamental role in determining the salience of a social identity, and as a conse-
quence behavior: social identity becomes salient when an individual categorizes them-
self with similar others in an intergroup context [10, 71]. Moreover, the social identity 
approach argues that social behavior also exists on a continuum: interpersonal behavior 
will occur when a personal identity is salient, whereas social identity makes intergroup 
behavior possible [73].  
Applied to the present context, it is social identities that make group cooperation, 
group collaboration and collective action possible. A large amount of social psycholog-
ical literature has examined how group-level processes – including social identification, 
social identity salience, norms, affect and efficacy – are integral to promoting cooper-
ation through collective action [49, 50, 77–82]. Moreover, a growing body of research 
indicates that designers can encourage collaboration and collective action participation 
by implementing social identity principles into platform design. The social identity ap-
proach has begun to examine how digital technology affects cooperation and participa-
tion within groups. Findings indicate that different platforms offer different identity 
signals and opportunities for action that affect collective action participation [83]. Here 
we are particularly interested in three distinct ways that ICTs affect collective action. 
Firstly, group-level communication and interaction have been found to play a fun-
damental role in computer-supported collective action. Specifically, opportunities for 
interaction can contribute to the building of shared social identity, group identification 
and norms for action [81, 84, 85]. For example, when users are able to interact via social 
media and express their group identities this increases their identification with their 
group and in turn promotes cooperation [86]. Second, research indicates that digital 
platforms can contain cues to identity that enhance (or diminish) the salience of group 
identities, which has implications for social influence, attraction, group cohesiveness 
and participation [87–89]. For example, Chan [90] found that the visual anonymity pro-
vided by email can promote donations to a collective cause by increasing the salience 
of group norms and reducing perceptions of differences within the group. In contrast, 
there are also affordances for action that can inhibit important outcomes, such as sus-
tained participation. For example, when platforms enable users to participate in low-
threshold and low-impact collective action, users have reduced willingness to partici-
pate further due to the feeling of having already made a satisfactory contribution to the 
group [91]. However, notwithstanding the negative effect on sustained participation, 
this finding also indicates more general principles: (1) users are concerned about and 
value group-level rewards for participation; and (2) digital platforms can offer oppor-
tunities for action that achieve those rewards. Taken together, these findings indicate 
that designers of marketized-commons platforms can facilitate cooperation, collabora-
tion and participation, by embracing social psychological principles and processes, and 
implementing them in the design of their platforms. We will draw on this research in 
section 6 to make specific recommendations for designers. 
6 Implications for Designers 
How can we design to support cooperation, collaboration, participation and contribu-
tion to the common good? One way of exploring this question is to consider how indi-
viduals need to be able to interact with each other in order to experience a sense of 
collective self. We have argued that marketized-commons platforms bring new com-
plexity to the ways in which individuals interact with each other and as a result moti-
vation, sustained participation and collaboration. In contrast to traditional tools that 
were designed to support cooperation and relied on intrinsic motivations or third-parties 
(i.e. social movement organizations, private companies, institutions for collective ac-
tion), the marketized-commons model assumes that a P2P market can provide sufficient 
motivation. Furthermore, we have suggested this model risks ignoring alternative path-
ways to cooperation and consequently may have the potential to undermine boarder 
goals; existing research indicates that a focus on financial incentives can erode intrinsic 
motives for collaboration and participation, even in other domains of engagement.  
Taken together this suggests that platform designers should not solely rely on finan-
cial incentives to stimulate participation within marketized-commons platforms. In-
stead our analysis indicates that that developers can support user aims by attending to 
users’ social psychological concerns. Moreover, research within the social identity ap-
proach implies that developers need to establish how users’ social identities can be nur-
tured, supported and receive appropriate value within their platforms. Thus, we suggest 
that important outcomes can be obtained by supporting group-level communication, 
representations and rewards. This suggestion extends existing recommendations in 
CSCW, which tend to center around interpersonal relations and individual-level con-
cerns. Building on the social identity approach and existing CSCW research, we sug-
gest three recommendations that designers can employ when creating P2P platforms 
for collective action participation.  
First, support varying levels of contact and exchange between platform users. Exist-
ing HCI research indicates that users have a variety of motives for participating in P2P 
platforms. In accordance with the marketized-commons model, instrumental motives 
have been identified as a key concern. Specifically, users want to receive goods and 
payment at an increased level of personal convenience. However, these papers also 
demonstrate that users also have social motives for engaging with these platforms [92–
96]. Accordingly, there are many design recommendations for balancing users’ instru-
mental and social goals, however these recommendations generally center on building 
interpersonal relationships [95, 97]. In contrast, the social identity approach implies 
that developers should also create opportunities that enable users to develop psycho-
logical connections to their group and group-based norms for cooperation. As already 
outlined in section 5, opportunities for group-level communication and interaction can 
play a key role in this respect [81, 84–86]. An example of this might be ‘group-level 
exchange’, in which marketized-commons platforms offer users the possibility to en-
gage as members of relevant social identities. For example, in the case of a ‘local com-
munity identity’ for users of a renewable energy trading platform. Users would have 
the opportunity to first form, and then interact within, a local community group. These 
interactions would be based around shared local community identity with other group 
members. The products of interaction (e.g., group-based norms, community identifica-
tion, community pride, social cohesion) are designed to improve the welfare of this 
imagined community as a whole.  
Similarly, we advocate a social identity approach to how information is presented to 
the user. Developers of marketized-commons platforms should consider how social 
identity-enhancing features can be incorporated into the platform interface. Existing 
HCI research highlights that how information is presented within P2P platforms is fun-
damental for promoting cooperation. In particular, representations of users that provide 
a sense of being with another (‘social presence’) facilitates trust, perceived reciprocity 
and sharing behavior [98]. Accordingly, recommendations for practice tend to focus on 
creating opportunities that allow users to present information about their personal iden-
tities. At the same time, there is also the acknowledgement that providing this type of 
information can accentuate users’ privacy concerns [97–99]. Research within the social 
identity tradition implies that opportunities to provide ‘depersonalized’ information 
could represent an alternative solution. Specifically, it indicates that opportunities to 
highlight characteristics that are prototypical of the group and present oneself as a ho-
mogenous group member will promote cooperation between users and collaboration 
for the common good [83]. Designers need to evaluate whether opportunities to display 
social identity-enhancing representations and markers can be built into P2P platforms. 
To incorporate ‘group-level features’ marketized-commons platforms could allow our 
exchange group could co-produce and display shared and depersonalized values. In the 
renewable energy context shared values for a local community identity might center on 
local and cooperative-owned wind turbines, or the local farmers market as a model of 
local sustainability and control.  
Finally, we suggest that developers of marketized-commons platforms should incor-
porate social identity values as part of the platform’s reward system. Specifically, they 
should provide opportunities for rewards at a collective-level as a means to motivate 
collective action participation. Although there are existing recommendations to provide 
opportunities for social and financial rewards in P2P platforms [100, 101], these rec-
ommendations tend to prioritize benefits for individuals rather than benefits for the 
group. As outlined in section 5, group-level benefits can provide an important motiva-
tion for engaging in computer-supported collective action [91]. These ‘group-level 
products’ could be financial or psychological in nature. For example, our local commu-
nity group could be given the opportunity to divert profit into products that have col-
lective benefit, like a community swimming pool (that is run using renewable technol-
ogy). Similarly, psychological benefit might be increased group reputation in the eyes 
of other community groups that are based in other locations.  
7 Conclusion 
The marketized-commons model gives researchers and developers a new way to think 
about organizing and motivating CSCW. In particular, it invites us to reconceptualize 
our notion of collective action and to explore new possibilities for supporting coopera-
tion and collaboration for the common good. At the same time, social psychological 
research provides a way to guide the development of marketized-commons platforms. 
It suggests that by attending to users’ social identities – and providing opportunities to 
value, nurture and build these identities – we can support users in obtaining their col-
lective goals. After all, motivation for collective action participation doesn’t have to be 
financial it can be psychological, and psychological motivations can operate on the 
group-level as well as the individual-level. HCI researchers and designers need to ex-
plore ways that digital technology can be used to support and harness these group-based 
motivations for the common good.  
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